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GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue,  
https://s100.copyright.com/AppDispatchServlet?publisherName=ELS&contentID=S0899825616300549&
orderBeanReset=true 
John Nash: A Personal Remembrance 
Vernon L. Smith 
Chapman University 
I was privileged to meet John many years ago at one of the many game theory conferences held at the 
State University of New York, Stony Brook. On this occasion, I was in the hotel breakfast room. I had 
finished breakfast, and I recognized John Nash sitting at a table, also alone, in the corner. I was heading 
to the day’s first conference presentation room where I would be making a presentation on our electric 
power experiments, conducted in collaboration with my colleagues Stephen Rassenti and Bart Wilson, 
who were not at the conference. (Rassenti et al., 2003a, 2003b) 
I was not sure how to find the conference room where I would be presenting so I walked over to John 
Nash’s table, introduced myself, and asked him if he knew where the room was. He replied that he was 
not sure himself, and suggested we look for it together. We found the room. After I gave my 
presentation, John asked the first question as a member of the audience; afterwards he came up to talk 
with me, fascinated by the whole exercise of designing a market for the exchange of wholesale power 
on a high voltage grid, and using laboratory subjects to test it in experiments. Moreover, as we report in 
Rassent et al. (2002), the exercise had been an essential element in informing the liberalization of the 
industry in New Zealand and Australia. John particularly wanted me to know that his father had been an 
electrical engineer and that he had always been interested in the subject.  
I want to point out that without either of us thinking about it as such, John’s proposal that we look for 
the room together, and my acceptance of it, demonstrated that we had chosen actions that constituted 
a Nash Equilibrium “solution” to our joint interactive task. At the time, we were neither friends nor both 
strangers—he was hardly a stranger to me for he was long known and acclaimed as one of the foremost 
contributors to mathematics and economics in the 20th century. I was surely a stranger to him as I was 
little known generally before the Nobel Foundation managed to find me in 2002.  
Some might say that my happy encounter with John was too “collaborative” to be a good example of a 
non-cooperative equilibrium, frequently believed to apply only to inherently competitive adversaries. 
But why is anyone collaborative with another, if not because they have mutual interests that draw them 
together, with each worse off if acting alone?  
Bidding at an auction for a work of art is only made possible by the many for whom the work has special 
value, inducing them to attend the auction. Their bidding behavior can be represented under particular 
conditions by a Nash Equilibrium bid function, b (v),  where v is the value of the work to a bidder and b 
her corresponding equilibrium bid. The form of this Nash Equilibrium bid function varies with the rules 
of the auction. The particular conditions that allow these bid function strategies to be derived by Nash’s 
methods, can be created in the laboratory, and a great many experimental studies of auction bidding 
behavior have been motivated by John’s insightful contributions. (Cox et al., 1982) “Insightful” is the 
right word, because Nash’s teacher, John von Neumann, saw the Nash theorem and its proof as trivial. I 
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suppose you could say that Einstein’s contributions followed trivially once the equations of motion in 
physics took account of the finite velocity of light. What was truly astonishing for both Nash and Einstein 
was the insight they had in the context of the thought frameworks of their respective times.   
Bidding to sell or to buy wholesale electrical energy on a complex high voltage grid can also be 
characterized in terms of Nash theory. Moreover, in repeat interaction subjects who have no knowledge 
of that theory do remarkably well in approximating Nash predicted behavior.  
A relatively unknown fact about Nash was that he was much interested in whether and how people 
might actually come to play the equilibrium of a game as he represented it.  In his PhD dissertation 
(Nash, 1950), there are two closing sections on “Motivation and Interpretation” and “Applications” that 
incisively discuss the theory’s empirical relevance.  
It is here that he observes that “the accepted ethics of fair play imply non-cooperative playing…” (p 26), 
that is, independence of action and a certain innocence of manipulative intent—an uncommon 
perspective in contemporary thinking. When he and I first met, neither of us had any expectation that 
we would become allies in looking for the seminar room!  
In his thesis, Nash considers “the ‘mass-action’ interpretation of equilibrium…It is unnecessary to 
assume that the participants have full knowledge of the total structure of the game, or the ability and 
inclination to go through any complex reasoning processes. But the participants are supposed to 
accumulate empirical information on the relative advantages of the pure strategies at their disposal.” 
(Nash, 1950, p 21)  
In such situations, laboratory experiments draw their power from affording cash motivated human 
subjects with empirical experience in interactions within the structure of the game we put them in. They 
are assigned and incentivized by strictly private values for outcome allocations, receive feedback 
information on the outcomes of their joint actions, and through repeat play gain empirical experience 
on better and worse outcomes. In many examples, including some that are quite complex, they 
converge to approximately equilibrium outcomes, perhaps in the sense that Nash referred to as a “mass 
action” process. (Smith, 2008) Moreover, increased public information on individual values, is often 
inimical to better individual and/or group outcomes. (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963, pp 57-58; 142-151; 
184-193; 199.) Hence, more information does not imply better outcomes. 
Much is still to be learned about exactly how people get it right in the successful examples, or how and 
where they go wrong when they fail to converge to the equilibrium.  
In our encounter John never mentioned his work and its obvious relevance to what we were learning 
from the electric power experiments. Rather he mentioned his father. My impression was that John was 




Cox, James, Roberson, Bruce and Smith, Vernon L. (1982) “Theory and Behavior of Single Object 
Auctions,” Research in Experimental Economics, (V. Smith,editor) Greenwich: JAI Press, Vol. 2. 
3 
 
Fouraker, Lawrence and Siegel, Sidney (1963) Bargaining Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Nash, John. (1950). “Non-cooperative Games.” PhD dissertation, Princeton University, May. 
Rassenti, Stephen J., Smith, Vernon L., and Wilson, Bart J. (2002). “Using Experiments to Inform the 
Privatization/Deregulation Movement in Electricity.” The Cato Journal, 21, 515-544 
Rassenti, Stephen J., Smith, Vernon L.  and Wilson, Bart J. (2003a). “Controlling market power and price 
spikes in electricity networks: demand-side bidding." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
100, 2998-3003.  
Rassenti, Stephen J., Smith, Vernon L., and Wilson, Bart J. (2003b). “Discriminatory price auctions in 
electricity markets: low volatility at the expense of high price levels,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 
23, 109-123. 
Smith, Vernon L. (2008). “Strategy-proof equilibrium behavior in two-sided auctions” in Handbook of 
Experimental Economics Results (Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith, editors), pp 84-91. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland. 
 
